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WARSAW, HAGUE, THE 88TH CONGRESS AND
LIMITED DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL
AIR CRASHES
DANIEL KARLIN
OR some twenty-eight years, the United States adherence to the
Warsaw Convention has resulted in tragic consequence to the
families of passengers who have met their death while in inter-
national air transportation, as well as to the persons severely injured
as a result of air crashes, bound by the terms of the Convention.
The incidence of unjust return for these catastrophes arises by
reason of the limitation of liability insofar as the air carrier is con-
cerned under the terms of the Warsaw Convention in that it restricts
the maximum amount of recovery to approximately $8,300.00 in
United States currency, unless willful misconduct on the part of the
carrier can be proven.
Recently, the Interagency Group on International Aviation re-
ported to the State Department its recommendations in connection
with the Warsaw Convention. The State Department has tentatively
approved these recommendations and has asked for Congressional
implementation thereof. The two basic related recommendations
made are:
(1) ratification of the Hague Protocol which (upon ratification by a sufficient
number of states) would raise the liability of carriers in international aviation
from the present limit of $8,300 to a new limit of $16,600; and
(2) enactment of complementary legislation which would require United
States flag carriers operating in international air transportation to provide all
passengers with automatic accident insurance in the amount of $50,000 for the
benefit of each passenger killed and up to $50,000 for each passenger injured
in an accident, in addition to the amount of recovery provided for in the Hague
Protocol.'
If there is validity to these amending concepts, it arises out of the
fact that with the exception of only one governmental agency partici-
pating in the recommendations, all of the agencies concur in the ac-
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knowledgment that neither the Warsaw Convention nor the Hague
Protocol provided a sufficient return for death and injury. The agency
that did not concur was the department of commerce.
It further acknowledges by virtue of another recommendation 2 that
for the first time the travelling public should be fully informed of the
existence of the limitation. While the proposed amendments do not,
in the writer's opinion, establish a realistic basis for the carrier's
liability and constitute under the treaty power an abrogation of the
right to full damages in the event of the carrier's negligence, the obli-
gation of disclosure satisfies a moral responsibility the air lines have
heretofore avoided.
It is to the question of the moral and legal validity of these recom-
mendations, as well as to the Warsaw Convention itself, that this
article is directed. It appears essential, therefore, that to properly
evaluate that question, one must look to the historical basis for the
doctrines involved.
How then, in a nation whose law holds repugnant and against its
public policy a common carrier's contract limiting its liability for neg-
ligence resulting in injury or death, did this come about?
It started in 1925 at the meeting in Paris. It culminated in 1929 at
the meeting in Warsaw. During the four years that it took to finalize
the agreement, the United States was not involved in any of the
discussions, although at the first conference and some of the others
including Warsaw, we were represented by observers . It was the
effort and the product of European aviation and government interest,
and it is important to look to the alleged causes for calling this con-
ference in the first instance.
Oddly enough, when the first meeting was called at the request of
the French Government, international air transportation was limited
in Europe to flights between Europe and Africa with the prime pas-
senger traffic being on a French airline. Only one United States air-
line could be said to be also so engaged and the extent of its inter-
national operation was Cuba as its furthest point. Going back to 1925,
the European air industry was just beginning to envisage long inter-
national flights. Germany was looking to the extension of its lighter-
than-air dirigible production and France was expanding its heavier-
2 id. at 364.
8 Ide, The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee
of Aerial Legal Experts, 3 J. AIR LAw 27 (1932).
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than-air commerce. The Atlantic had not as yet been crossed by either
medium. Although the fact of one-way flight was accomplished in
1927 and 1928, it was not until 1928 that the Graf Zeppelin completed
the first round trip from Germany to America and return. The times,
therefore, were one of conflict in air transport ideology; would the
future of flight be lighter-than-air or heavier-than-air? Whichever it
was to be, it becomes obvious in retrospection that the contemplation
of air expansion was to be hazardous both financially and in operation,
and so to the European signators to the convention, limitation of lia-
bility, monetary and otherwise, was the prime consideration. A major
crash at that time could constitute the loss or diminishing use of capital
or the necessity for additional government subsidy. Insurance cover-
ing the airlines was not then the industry it is today, and necessarily
the hazards of travel at that time viewed with the limitation of passen-
ger volume made the risk to the underwriter a serious handicap in the
acquisition to the air carrier of sufficient coverage. It was obviously
to the advantage of these governments, and the airlines represented
thereby, to find the means for extension of their interests through the
Convention; and if passenger traffic had to be subservient to the needs
of the industry, these governments were willing to take the necessary
steps in that direction.
That the intent was open and notorious cannot be questioned. The
convention was not called for the unification of rules of air transport
as such, but primarily for the limiting factor. The original text pre-
sented by the French Government to the first meeting of the com-
mittee at its direction called for a conference and I quote, "For fixing
the liability of air carriers and for the limitation of that liability in the
matter of air transport."'4 This purpose did not change from the first
meeting through the final conference. The motivating force in the con-
vention was the committee appointed which was the International
Committee of Legal Air Experts who over the years required to com-
plete their work met on various occasions in Paris, Brussels, Madrid
and Warsaw. Notwithstanding the fact that we had no part in formu-
lating the articles of Warsaw, we adhered to the same in 1934 by
presidential proclamation and senate ratification." Subsequent to our
adherence, we were represented at further conferences eventually
4 Minutes, 2nd International Conference on Private Air Law, Warsaw, Oct. 4-12,
p. 159 (1929).
5 49 Stat. 3000 (1929); 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong. Rec. 11577 (1934) (ratification).
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leading to the formulation of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation of which we are now a member, and to our participation in the
formulation of the Hague Protocol, which was consummated in 1955
as an amendatory process to Warsaw.
Since both the Convention and the Protocol apply to international
transportation, it should be clear to the reader that it is not the flight
that controls but the contract of carriage.
Article 1 of the Convention defines international flights. It states:
International transportation is any transportation in which according to the
contract, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not
there be a break in the transportation are situated either within the territories
of two High Contracting Parties or within the territory of a single contracting
party, if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another power
even though that party is not a party to the convention. It follows that trans-
portation within the single territory without such a stopping place is not deemed
international.
By way of illustration, it becomes apparent that in the event a pas-
senger purchases a through ticket from Chicago to Paris, France, by
way of New York, his international transportation commences the
moments he boards at Chicago. If on that flight, an accident occurs in
New York within the continental limits of this country, that passenger
would be bound by the terms of the Warsaw Convention or the
Hague Protocol, if ratified, and would be limited to the maximum
under either of those documents. The injustice that is immediately
seen in this connection, is that, insofar as the other passengers on the
plane may be concerned, since their tickets are for domestic flight,
they could recover unlimited damages for death or injury.
It becomes manifest, therefore, that the State Department recom-
mendations would seek to find an answer which, while it does not
obviate the wide distinction in amount of recovery, at least would
tend to give the international passenger on U.S. flag carriers only the
compulsory insurance coverage in excess of the Convention and
Protocol.
It would appear that in order to do this, both the ratification of the
Hague Protocol and the enactment of legislation for automatic insur-
ance would necessarily be accomplished at one and the same time.
While it would appear that this is contemplated, and if not accom-
plished would not satisfy the recommendations, it becomes apparent
that, while the Protocol may be readily adopted by the advice and
consent of the Senate, it would take the joint action of both houses
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of Congress to effect the automatic insurance provision. For this
reason, it is not inconceivable that the Protocol would be ratified and
the automatic insurance legislation be ineffective by way of defeat in
passage, lengthy tabling, or even, if adopted, find itself declared invalid
by reason of a possible constitutional violation. Should this situation
find itself subsequently true, then the travelling public on U.S. flag
carriers together with the non-covered foreign carrier remain faced
with the gross inadequacy of the Convention and/or the Protocol.
Another factor that becomes involved in connection with the auto-
matic insurance recommendation is the dilemma that the United States
flag carriers will face in that the premium consideration for life and
accident insurance would be substantially greater than that which
would be obtained on a public liability basis and would constitute a
heavier burden in their competition for passenger traffic against for-
eign flag carriers. It is unique that both the IGIA and the tentative
State Department recommendations have seen fit to offer the auto-
matic insurance legislation as an answer to the defects in Warsaw and
Hague, when for some long time one of the considerations advanced
for the retention of the Warsaw Convention has been that the United
States flag carriers would greatly suffer competitively if they were
not covered under the Convention only to the same extent other for-
eign carriers would be.
Statistically, the problem becomes more complex. For the year end-
ing May 31, 1961, in the Trans-Adantic air traffic passage 62.8 per
cent of the passengers were carried by foreign flag carriers.6
When one compares these figures with relation to the total number
of United States citizens departing for European countries which for
the year ending June 30, 1960, totalled 797,211 as opposed to 254,000
visitors to the United States from these countries, it becomes obvious
that approximately two-thirds of our flying public utilized foreign
flag carriers.
Assuming that the complimentary legislation for automatic insur-
ance was in effect, it would apply to only approximately one-third
of our citizens, leaving two-thirds of the citizens in international trans-
portation subject to the limitation of the Protocol alone. The denial
of equality in this situation is again in the balance.
While the limitation under Warsaw was drastic, it is none the less
6 F.A.A., Report of Task Force on Int'l. Aviation Goals, p. 108 (1961).
7 Id. at 110.
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so under the Protocol, for if one is to consider the present value of the
dollar, the purchasing power of the Protocol recovery today is no
greater than the limitation under Warsaw was at the time of our
adherence.
Realizing the implications of international agreements and the
difficulties that may be incurred in denunciation thereof, it never-
theless must follow that if we are to retain our adherence to the Con-
vention or to ratify the Protocol, we must do so on the basis of a
consistency of purpose and the recognition of a need therefor. If there
is need for our conduct in retention of the concept of limitation, it
must be found in one of the reasons heretofore expressed as an argu-
ment justifying the provisions of those doctrines. Let us see if we
can assess their validity.
The comparison of aviation limitation with admiralty doctrine can-
not be said to be a sound one. The historical contrasts do not meet
or do the concepts of limitation find themselves compatible. The
doctrine of limitation in admiralty law does not apply as to negli-
gence and unseaworthiness known or imputed to the owner, and the
limitations which are apparent to that law are not as consistent in
application to the overall limitation of Warsaw. In addition, our
Congress has consistently sought to improve the rights of passengers
in connection with inequities found therein by passage of the Death
on the High Seas Act, which is unlimited except insofar as some
territorial state water may be concerned; Congress has also increased
the amount of recovery in the event of total loss of the ship and has
declared by statute8 that any stipulation limiting liability for negli-
gence as to death or injury is invalid. We have declared in one situa-
tion that public policy denies the right of limitation and have, by vir-
tue of adherence to a convention, enforced the limitation in another.
The relationship thus seems to be one of contrast and not analogy.
By virtue of this statute, a recent decision in Hawthorne v. Holland
American Line? established the rule that contractually relieving lia-
bility if the passenger was guilty of contributory negligence was in-
valid. Yet Article 21 of the Convention reserves this defense to the
carrier.
The argument for the need to protect the development of the
aviation industry certainly has no basis in fact today with relation to
8 46 U.S.C. S 1183 (1958).
9 160 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1958).
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the rights of its passengers. In reviewing this facet, as well as the other
arguments, Mr. H. Drion states:
The idea that aviation would be impossible without limitation of liability is
flatly contradicted by the facts. Though USA law has no limitation of liability
of air carrier or aircraft operator, neither with respect to passenger or cargo
claims nor to surface damage, there is no country in the world where civil avi-
ation has developed to a comparative level. And not only does American law
not know of special limitations of liability for the protection of aviation, but
the claims awarded there against carriers and operators are avowedly higher
than anywhere else.10
It is not necessary to extend on this statement.
To the extent that the theory has been advanced that the limitation
is necessary to allow the aviation interest to avoid bearing catastrophic
risks alone, it seems sufficient to state that this burden is not peculiar
to aviation. In a nation whose law places a greater legal burden on
hazardous industries, it appears rather credulous to utilize the hazard
to minimize the burden.
Another seriously projected argument and one relied upon in our
original adherence to the Warsaw Convention is that the industry
must be placed in a desirable position to obtain insurance. The impli-
cation of this contention has little merit when viewed with the present
answer provided to solve the problem. Assuming that automatic in-
surance could be provided as recommended, it is still contended that
the burden of securing additional adequate coverage for the flight
can be resolved in the action of the passenger providing his own
coverage which he may purchase at the airport.
It is appreciated that the damages recoverable may well be in serious
or catastrophic occurrence in excess of maximum-self-passenger cov-
erage, but the truth of this probability lends greater emphasis to the
inequity of limitation and it seems a strange rule which would impose
the burden of protection from wrong upon the victim thereof. To
adopt such a rule is inconsistent with the realities of passenger traffic.
The airlines are not seeking select classes of passengers, nor should the
redress of wrong be predicated on the averages of death or injury cost.
There is a colloquial axiom in casualty damages: "You take your plain-
tiff as you find him." If the extension of private air transport looks to
the commercial Mach 2 run in flight all over the world, it should be
prepared to accept the cost of catastrophe as well as it may expect the
expansion of profit. Certainly, in the confines of domestic traffic,
10 Drion, Limitations of Liability in International Air Law (The Hague 1954).
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Which far exceeds international flight, there has been a consistency of
adequate underwriting for the payment of domestic accident claims.
The concept behind the passenger's purchase of life insurance
seems to have its basis on the theory that the individual, whose wrong-
ful death or injury brings larger damages, is deriving benefit at the
expense of the passenger whose death or injury results in smaller
damages. There is an incongruity arising out of the automatic insur-
ance recommendation in connection with this balancing of benefits
in that the measure of coverage would be inconsistent as the passenger
whose death would result in smaller damage would receive the same
as the one allegedly entitled to greater damages.
As to the position that the limitation is valid in that it arises out of
a system of liability imposed on the carrier, thereby granting to the
plaintiff a presumption of negligence, it would appear that under the
present acceptance of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, the presump-
tion would exist without the benefit of the allegation that it arises
from the Convention.
The writer could not help but be impressed with the argument that
the limitation lessens litigation by facilitating quick settlement. The
theory is neither new nor justifiable particularly in view of the inad-
equacy of payment. It was advanced in 1934 at the time of our original
adherence as well as it is today.
It is enough to say that the proponents of the limitation utilize it
frequently. In an article appearing in the Journal of Air Law and
Commerce, the following statement appears:
For the average passenger claimant in international air transport the Warsaw-
Hague provisions [which you know now will be $16,584] permits a new re-
covery that makes available more compensation more readily than is true in
other personal injury situations. The social interest in getting reasonable com-
pensation to the average claimants promptly is so great that several proposals
to improve the compensation for personal injury and death in automobile acci-
dent cases, for example, have recommended that if a scheme were devised which
would expedite and assure reasonable compensation, a limit of liability as low as
$6,500 per person is justifiable.11
The article urging the adoption of the Hague Protocol was written
by Mr. Paul Reiber, then assistant to the General Council, Air Trans-
port Association of America.
As to the concept that unification in international transport is neces-
11 Reiber, Ratification of the Hague Protocol; Its Relation to the Uniform Inter-
national Air Carrier Liability Law Achieved by the Warsaw Convention, 23 J. AIR
L. & COM. 272 (1956).
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sary, it would seem that, with the varying standards of the world, a
monetary limitation in an international air convention has its justifi-
cation only in self-interest and has no ethical basis in connection with
the diversity of social economic passenger needs in the 107 jurisdic-
tions within which it now operates.
To the extent that argument has been projected that we will fail
in our international commitments if we denounce Warsaw and fail to
ratify the Protocol, it is difficult to accept a course of conduct which
mitigates the rights of man on the basis of foreign relations. It would
seem that, if the theory behind the limitation provokes an injustice
upon the citizenship of this country, we should accept the leadership
in that connection.
It is of interest that the chairman of our delegation to the Hague
Conference has expressed the theory that the concept of Warsaw and
Hague be extended to domestic air transportation in this country. In
an article, he had this to say:
The Grand Canyon accident serves to underscore the need to put our legal
house in order in the domestic air transport liability field. The rules presently
applicable to airline passenger injury and death claims promote injustice, foster
unnecessary litigation and increase costs of making reparation when accidents
arise. The Warsaw Convention, as amended by The Hague Protocol, is a good
approach to this problem, and while the limits of liability set forth therein may
be too low for domestic use, in its basic approach it is believed best for the travel-
ing public and for air transportation.12
This proposal invades not only a severe legal problem but points out
that the emphasis on Warsaw-Hague acceptance may relate less to the
question of treaty commitment than to the retention and extension of
the doctrine of limitation. This seems to be particularly so when one
realizes that neither Warsaw or Hague are true diplomatic treaties in
the sense that we know them, but are primarily designed to the protec-
tion of private aviation interest.
In the event that we are to withdraw from the Convention and do
not accept the 'Protocol, it is true that in some cases we shall be faced
with the fact that in some countries the limitation may be less than
that of the Protocol. The problem, however, does not seem to be as
severe when viewed in contemplation of the total number of countries
involved in the Convention since, according to a tabulation by the
International Civil Aviation Secretariat, there were only thirteen of the
12 Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw, and The Hague Protocol, J. AIR L. & CoM. 271
(1956).
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forty-five nations under Warsaw whose death limits are less than what
the Protocol will afford.'"
It would seem more realistic that the protection from limitation
should extend to the greater portion of the flying public and that
some way be found to satisfy the inequity in connection with those
situations wherein a problem may result by way of comity as to these
thirteen countries.
It is as inconsistent to place the validity of Warsaw or Hague on
the premise that these countries are below the limit of Hague as it
would be to impose a total limitation on domestic travel, because a
few of our states still retain the archaic concept of limited damages
under their wrongful death statutes.
So far as the question of comity may be involved, it would not be
presumptuous to assume that our Courts might, in unconscionable
limitations, declare the public policy in avoidance thereof. It is diffi-
cult, either legally or morally, to find a rationalization for confirming
a death limit as to one of our citizens in connection with the limitation
imposed in Italy which restricts the amount of damages for death to
160,000 lira convertible to $256.00 in United States currency. One
realizes that this invades the fine concept of conflicts but if we are
to accept a change in concept, let it be to grant the right rather than
to take it.
Parenthetically, the writer notes that the Russian Government, in
adopting its new Civil Air Code, has without the consent of the sig-
nators to the Convention provided that its Courts may, in their dis-
cretion, allow for the payment of the award under Warsaw in pe-
riodic sums. 4
If one looks for additional justification of the denunciation of the
Convention, perhaps an answer may be found in the fact that under
a Protocol to the Convention, as well as is contained in the Hague
'3 I.C.A.O., Document 7450-LC Vol. II, Annex VI, Appendix 7, 9th Session of the
Legal Commerce (Rio de Janeiro 1953).*
Belgium ................. $5,000.00 Netherlands ............ $ 3,289.00
Brazil ................... 5,405.41 New Zealand ........... 13,964.00
Denmark ................ 2,645.00 Poland .............. 10,000 zlotys*
Germany ................ 7,460.00 Sweden ................ 3,509,00
Italy .................... 256.00 Costa Rica .............. 3,561.88
Luxembourg ............ 7,500.00 Guatemala .............. 5,000.00
M exico ................. 8,670.00
* United States convertible unknown.
14 108 Cong. Rec. A3861 (May 23, 1962).'See: Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, United
States Court of Appeals (2d Cir.) 1962) Docket Number 27305.
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Protocol, the United States Government has exempted its own air-
craft from the limitation. It follows that under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the United States Government is subject to the payment
of unlimited damages in the event of liability arising out of the crash
of one of its planes.1 5 It is somewhat of a paradox that notwithstanding
this, by virtue of its adherence to the Convention, it condones the
benefit of limitation upon private carriers in competitive profit enter-
prise.
While the space of this article does not allow for a discussion of
the cases in which Warsaw has been involved, or the question of the
constitutional problems inherent thereto, it would seem that a rational-
ization of Warsaw and Hague should include some of the changes
that have been adopted in the Hague Protocol which do not appear
in the recommendations, for the increase to $16,600.00 by the Hague
Protocol has not come without cost to the claimant. In that document
the conference has expressly taken away the right to sue the members
of the crew individually and thereby avoid the limitation by reason of
the fact that a decision heretofore adopted by our Courts has held that
the crew was not covered under the provisions of the Convention and
that unlimited damages could be recovered, if it was held to be
negligent.16
In the same document, they have restricted the definition of wilful
misconduct to the severe interpretation that our Courts have hereto-
fore given it. With relation to the theory of wilful misconduct under
Warsaw, in some of the foreign jurisdictions it was held that gross
negligence was sufficient to avoid the limitation. In the now famous
Frohman case 17 the Court adopted the theory that "wilful" means
"intentional" and was extended even more strongly in the case of
KLM v. Tuller, 8 where the Court approved the interpretation that
wilful misconduct was "a deliberate purpose not to discharge some
15 Blumenthal v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
16 Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, 153 F. Supp. 486 (D. N.J. 1957).
17 Frohman v. Pan American Airways (1953), U.S. and Canadian Aviation Reports I
at page 6, "Wilful ordinarily means intentional. The act that was done was what the
person doing it intended to do. But the phrase 'wilful misconduct' means something
more than that. It means that in addition to doing the act in question, the actor must
have intended the result that came about or must have launched on such a line of con-
duct with knowledge of what the consequence probably would be, and gone ahead
recklessly despite his knowledge of these conditions."
18 292 F. 2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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duty necessary to safety."'19 It is more than apparent that under this
article, the possibilities of recovery under the wilful misconduct provi-
sion of the Hague Protocol" will be now universally improbable, par-
ticularly when one realizes that the doctrine has been sustained in this
country in only two cases. 2'
These are the problems that face the Eighty-Eighth Congress. If,
through its actions, the Warsaw Convention be denounced and the
Hague Protocol be not ratified, it shall have presumptively expressed
thereby the right of justice.
In a recent publication by the Federal Aviation Agency known
as "Project Horizon," its chapter on safety ends with these words:
For a nation devoted to Human Values, no effort should be spared in seeking,
elusive though it may appear to be, the absolute in Air Safety.
May I paraphrase this hope for the future? That no effort should be
spared in seeking, not elusive that it may be, a just return to the human
values involved in the loss of life and crippling injury, arising out of the
abridgment of that safety. As a nation devoted to human values, we
should do no less.
1o ld. at 781.
20 Article 25, Hague Protocol.
21 K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines Holland v. Tuller, 292 F. 2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
len v. American Air Lines, 186 F. 2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
